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ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ARITHMETICALLY MISCALCULATED THE
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES.
In his response brief, Mr. Jonsson merely parrots the trial court's Memorandum

Decision, including its miscalculation of damages. Because no "new matter" is set forth
by Mr. Johnson in his Brief of Appellee (see Utah R. App. P. 24(c), limiting reply briefs
to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief), and because the issue
concerning the trial court's miscalculation has been discussed thoroughly in the Brief of
Appellants at Argument I, defendants direct the Court's attention thereto.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED
INTEREST ON THE PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES.

PREJUDGMENT

Plaintiffs response to defendants' argument that prejudgment interest is not
appropriate under the facts of this case cites no law not previously addressed by
defendants in their Brief of Appellants. Rather, plaintiff relies exclusively on a stubborn
misreading of those cases to insist that such an award is proper because Mr. Jonsson told
Mr. Bromley, after "asking around," that the value of the generator and switching
equipment was "between Thirty-Six and Forty-Six Thousand Dollars."
Controlling case law prohibits any award of prejudgment interest where the
amount of damages is ascertained and assessed by the trier of fact at trial:
[W]here the damage is complete and the amount of loss fixed
as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts
and figures, interest should be allowed from that time and not
2

from the date of the judgment. On the other hand, where
damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with
mathematical accuracy . . . the amount of damage must be
ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at the trial,
and in such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed.
Klinger v. Kightlv, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Price-Orem v. Rollins.
Brown & Gunnell 784 P.2d 475, 482 (Utah App. 1989)) (emphasis added).

The

mathematical accuracy needed to support an award of prejudgment interest requires that:
[damages] must be ascertainable in accordance with fixed
rules of evidence and known standards of value, which the
court or jury must follow infixing the amount, rather than
be[ing] guided by their best judgment in assessing the
amount to be allowed for past as well as for future injury, or
for elements that cannot be measured by any fixed standards
of value.
Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Utah App. 1990) (citing PriceOrem, 784 P.2d at 483) (emphasis added). A damage award that is the product of an
exercise of judgment by the trial court or jury is a legally insufficient basis for an award
of prejudgment interest.
Two of plaintiffs own cases illustrate the correct application of this principle:
Castillo v. Atlanta Casualty Co., 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah App. 1997), and Corina v. Wilcox,
898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995). In Castillo (involving a dispute over the value of a car), the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's award of prejudgment interest where the amount
of the plaintiffs damages was determined by the testimony of an expert witness, whose
valuation methodology the trial court accepted and followed in fixing the specific
damages. 939 P.2d at 1206. The appellate court agreed that the expert's testimony,
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accepted and followed by the trial court, proved a loss that "was fixed as of a particular
time, could be measured by facts and figures, and was complete prior to the
judgment

" Id. at 1213.

Compare the result in Castillo with the result in Corina (involving a dispute over
the value of livestock) in which case the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
denial of prejudgment interest where:
the jury heard conflicting testimony from experts regarding
the cattle's expected pregnancy rates, weight range, loss rates,
and market prices. In addition, the jury heard divergent
evidence regarding the calves' expected gender, weight range,
mortality rates, and market prices. Plaintiffs could not
establish these elements as a matter of fact, and thus the jury
was free to use its best judgment in ascertaining and
assessing the damages.
898 P.2d at 1387 (emphasis added). The crucial distinction between the results in Castillo
and Corina is that, in the first case, the trial court accepted and followed the expert's
testimony regarding the plaintiffs' loss; whereas, in the second case, the conflicting and
divergent expert testimony required the finder of fact to exercise its best judgment to
estimate the value of the plaintiffs' loss.
As the Utah Supreme Court cogently observed in Corina, "[w]hile the expert's
estimates were a reliable enough basis for awarding damages, the assumptions used to
arrive at those estimates are by no means the only way to arrive at [the] damages" and
"[wjithout any clear factual information, plaintiffs' damages could not be measured by
'facts and figures' or 'calculated with mathematical accuracy.'" Id. at 1387 (citations
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omitted). That is the situation here, as well, where plaintiffs experts provided a range of
values representing their estimates of plaintiff s loss, and the trial court then exercised its
best judgment to select an appropriate figure from that range to ascertain and assess
plaintiffs damages. As in Corina, the trial court's method of assessing plaintiffs loss in
the case below was a reliable enough basis for awarding damages, but not sufficiently
precise to support an award of prejudgment interest. Id.
Mr. Jonsson's repeated reference in his Brief to "wrongful" conduct by Mr.
Bromley is irrelevant to the issue on appeal. The purpose of an award of damages to Mr.
Jonsson for Mr. Bromely's breach is remedial, not punitive. Mr. Jonsson asserted a claim
for punitive damages, which was denied by the trial court. The issue now before this
Court is whether Mr. Jonsson's damages for breach of contract were calculable with
mathematical accuracy at the time of Mr. Bromley's breach of the parties' contract. In
fact, Mr. Jonsson's damages were not calculable with precision at that time, as is apparent
where neither Mr. Jonsson nor his expert witnesses were able to agree to the value of the
generator and switching equipment without reference to a range of figures.

This

uncertainty forced the trial court to use its best judgment to estimate Mr. Jonsson's
damages.
In this case, an award of prejudgment interest is not permitted under controlling
Utah precedent. Mr. Jonsson has not, and cannot, identify any authority to the contrary.
The best argument that Mr. Jonsson has raised in his Brief is that the amount of damages
awarded by the trial court is "very close" to the amount Mr. Jonsson told Mr. Bromley it
5

would take to supply a suitable replacement for the generator and switching equipment
Mr. Bromely had sold to a third party, in breach of the parties' contract. The controlling
legal standard for an award of prejudgment interest is that damages be calculable with
mathematical certainty, which standard is not satisfied by an estimate, even where that
estimate is "very close."

CONCLUSION
The trial court arithmetically miscalculated the plaintiffs damages. The court's
error was compounded when it awarded prejudgment interest on an excessive judgment.
Prejudgment interest should not have been awarded at all. Prejudgment interest is not
allowed, under Utah law, where the judgment is the result of the trial court's exercise of
discretion. The judgment in this case is the result of arithmetic miscalculation and the
exercise of discretion.
DATED this 10 day of November, 2000.

J. THOMAS BECKETT
ELLEN KITZMILLER
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellants
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